Choppy Waters for volunteer organisations
Was a volunteer coastguard rescue officer a “worker” during periods of paid activity?
Yes, ruled the Court of Appeal in Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) v Groom
Background
The case arose from the long-standing involvement of Martin Groom, who had served since 1985 as a Coastguard Rescue Officer (CRO) with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency’s (MCA) Coastguard Rescue Service, a large network of volunteer emergency responders across the UK.
Although the role was nominally voluntary, volunteers were entitled to claim remuneration for specific activities, including emergency call-outs and certain training, calculated by reference to time spent. Remuneration was paid through payroll, with tax and national insurance deductions.
In May 2020, following a disciplinary process that culminated in the termination of his position, Mr Groom sought to exercise his statutory right to be accompanied at an appeal by a trade union representative under section 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999, with that right applying to both employees and “workers”.
The MCA refused his request on the basis that he was not a worker, given that his role was described as purely voluntary and with no underlying contractual obligations. As a result, Mr Groom raised a claim in the employment tribunal arguing that he was a worker and therefore entitled to be accompanied at his disciplinary appeal.
At the preliminary hearing, the Employment Tribunal held that Mr Groom was not a worker, emphasising the voluntary nature of his role and finding that no contract was in place. Additionally, the payment regime (which required claims to be submitted rather than providing automatic payment) was deemed insufficient to create a contract. Mr Groom appealed that decision.
The case reached the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) and then, on further appeal, the Court of Appeal, which delivered its judgment in January 2026.
Applicable Law
The central legal issue concerned the statutory definition of a “worker” under section 230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. Under this limb (often referred to as a “limb (b) worker”), an individual is a worker if they have entered into, or work under, any contract to perform work or services personally for another party where that party is not acting as a client or customer of the individual.
Worker status triggers certain employment rights, including the right to be accompanied at disciplinary hearings, entitlement to the national minimum wage, paid annual leave, protection against unlawful deductions from wages, and certain whistleblowing protections.
The legal question was whether Mr Groom had such contractual arrangements with the MCA — not as an overarching employment contract covering his entire period of volunteering, but on each occasion that he attended an activity for which he was entitled to payment.
A key element of the debate was whether the entitlement to remuneration, even where not automatic, indicated mutual obligations sufficient to generate a contract of service or a contract for personal work/services that would bring him within the statutory definition of a worker, despite the voluntary label used in the volunteer handbook and other documents.
Decision
EAT
The EAT disagreed with the ET, concluding that a contract arose each time Mr Groom attended a remunerated activity, because on such occasions, there was mutuality of obligation and a clear right to payment for personal services rendered. It was irrelevant that remuneration was not automatic and that many volunteers did not claim it; the statutory definition of a worker focused on the existence of a contract for work or services personally undertaken.
Court of Appeal
The Court of Appeal upheld the EAT’s decision and dismissed the MCA’s appeal. The court clarified that its task was not to decide whether Mr Groom was an employee, nor whether there was an overarching contract covering his entire volunteer tenure. The sole issue was whether, on each occasion he attended a remunerated activity, he fell within the statutory definition of a worker.
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal considered the MCA Volunteer Handbook, Code of Conduct, and remuneration arrangements collectively. It concluded that although volunteers could choose whether to respond to call-outs, once they did attend, they were required to comply with reasonable instructions and were entitled to hourly pay processed through payroll, reflecting a classic wage/work arrangement. The absence of an obligation to accept work, or gaps between engagements, did not negate worker status for those specific periods of work.
Comment
Natasha Johnston, Associate in our Employment team, comments:
“This decision highlights that the nature of the relationship, rather than the title of ‘volunteer’, determines statutory status. Simply calling an individual a ‘volunteer’ does not prevent them from attaining worker status if they are paid for their time (rather than just reimbursed for expenses).
“Where volunteers are entitled to remuneration that goes beyond mere expenses, organisations should be cautious, particularly where this is coupled with obligations or expectations of personal service and compliance with instructions.
“Practically, this highlights the importance of carefully drafting volunteer policies and remuneration structures and should serve as a reminder to organisations to assess volunteer relationships on a case-by-case basis, focusing on whether contractual elements and enforceable entitlements exist in practice”.
Published 20 February 2026
